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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The appellant in this case, Becton Dickinson & Company 
("BDC"), brought suit against the Internal Revenue Service 
(the "IRS") pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 7426(a)(1), seeking the 
return of $323,948.44, the value of Reinhard 
Wolckenhauer's pension and retirement benefits held by 
BDC and seized by the IRS to satisfy Wolckenhauer's tax 
liability. BDC contends that this money should be paid not 
to the IRS, but rather to BDC as restitution for the fraud 
perpetrated on the company by Wolckenhauer. 
 
Although BDC's suit to recover this money was filed after 
the expiration of the nine-month time limitation period, set 
forth in section 6532(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, BDC 
argues that the time limitation in section 6532(c) can and 
should be equitably tolled.1 BDC contends for that reason 
that the restitution order handed down by the District 
Court in Wolckenhauer's criminal trial grants them an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. There are two distinct questions: Can the time limitation in section 
6532(c) be equitably tolled and, if so, do the facts of this case give 
rise 
to a situation in which the time limitation in section 6532(c) should be 
equitably tolled? 
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interest in the $323,948.44 seized by the IRS to satisfy 
Wolckenhauer's tax liability. Finally, assuming that it 
possesses an interest in this money, BDC argues that its 
restitution interest in Wolckenhauer's pension and 
retirement benefits is superior to the IRS's tax liability 
interest. 
 
The IRS and BDC each filed motions for summary 
judgment. The District Court, after concluding that the time 
limitation set forth in 26 U.S.C. S 6532(c) could be equitably 
tolled, held that the facts of the case did not give rise to a 
situation in which the time limitation should be equitably 
tolled, denied BDC's motion for summary judgment, and 
granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment. Because 
we conclude that the time limitation in section 6532(c) is a 
jurisdictional bar that cannot be equitably tolled, regardless 
of the equities in a given case, we will remand the case to 
the District Court with instructions to dismiss the case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 
 
I. FACTS 
 
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed by the 
parties. While employed at Ivers-Lee,3  Reinhard 
Wolckenhauer4 defrauded Ivers-Lee by means of an 
elaborate scheme involving fraudulent purchasing invoices. 
On February 28, 1995, Wolkenhauer was indicted for 
conspiracy (one count), mail fraud (fifteen counts) and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because we conclude that section 6532(c) cannot be equitably tolled, 
we need not reach the question of whether the time limitation in section 
6532(c) should be equitably tolled or whether BDC's restitution interest 
in Wolckenhauer's pension and retirement benefits is superior to the 
IRS's tax liability interest. Were we, however, to reach that question, 
Judges Roth and Barry believe that a strong argument could be made 
that in the unique circumstances of this case, i.e., where Wolckenhauer's 
tax liability arose solely as the result of the fraud he perpetrated on 
BDC 
and where the government levied on his pension and retirement benefits 
held by BDC, thus depriving BDC -- the victim-- of restitution, BDC's 
restitution interest is superior to the government's tax liability 
interest. 
 
3. Ivers-Lee is a division of Becton Dickinson & Company. 
 
4. Wolckenhauer is an appellee in name only. This appeal arises entirely 
out of a dispute between the IRS and BDC. 
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filing of false income tax returns (four counts). On April 21, 
1995, the IRS, which had been investigating 
Wolckenhauer's criminal activities, issued a notice of levy to 
the Ivers-Lee division of BDC indicating that Wolckenhauer 
owed $865,240.06 in unpaid federal income taxes for the 
tax years 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991.5 The notice of levy 
directed BDC to relinquish to the IRS all money that BDC 
then owed Wolckenhauer. Pursuant to this notice of levy, 
on May 2, 1995, BDC remitted to the IRS $323,948.44, the 
value of Wolckenhauer's pension and retirement benefits. 
 
On March 22, 1996, Wolckenhauer pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy, mail fraud and the filing of false income tax 
returns. The government and Wolckenhauer stipulated in 
the plea agreement that the financial loss to BDC as a 
result of Wolckenhauer's fraudulent scheme was no less 
than $1.5 million, but no more than $2.5 million. On 
September 24, 1996, the District Court in Wolckenhauer's 
criminal case entered an order requiring Wolckenhauer to 
make restitution to BDC in the amount of $2.2 million. On 
November 7, 1996, BDC, which had already brought suit 
against Wolckenhauer and other individuals in connection 
with Wolckenhauer's fraudulent scheme, filed an amended 
complaint in the District Court asserting a cause of action 
against the IRS for the alleged wrongful levy on 
Wolckenhauer's pension and retirement benefits. Suing 
under 26 U.S.C. S 7426(a)(1), BDC contended that "[the 
September 24, 1996,] order of restitution issued in favor of 
Becton Dickinson has priority over and is superior to the 
[government's] federal tax liens." App. at A74. 
 
On May 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit vacated the September 24, 1996, restitution order 
and remanded the case to the District Court for additional 
fact-finding concerning Wolckenhauer's assets and the 
needs of his dependent family members. On March 12, 
1998, the District Court in Wolckenhauer's criminal case 
amended the restitution order and directed Wolckenhauer 
to pay $83,200 in restitution to BDC. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The tax liability that Wolckenhauer incurred arose entirely from 
income "earned" by means of this fraudulent scheme. 
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Finally, on July 15, 1998, at the request of BDC and 
Wolckenhauer, the District Court in Wolckenhauer's 
criminal case modified the March 12, 1998, restitution 
order, taking into account the possibility that BDC might 
prevail in this litigation against the IRS. The amended 
restitution order requires Wolckenhauer to make restitution 
to BDC in the amount of $407,148.44, to be reduced to 
$83,200 in the event that BDC does not obtain a favorable 
judgment in this case.6 
 
BDC brings this wrongful levy action pursuant to 26 
U.S.C. S 7426(a)(1), seeking to recover the value of 
Wolckenhauer's pension and retirement benefits from the 
IRS to satisfy the aforementioned restitution order. 7 On 
March 3 and 5, 1997, respectively, the IRS and BDC each 
filed motions for summary judgment. On October 28, 1998, 
the District Court denied BDC's motion for summary 
judgment and granted the IRS's motion for summary 
judgment, holding that: (1) BDC's wrongful levy claim 
against the IRS was barred by the time limitation set forth 
in 26 U.S.C. S 6532(c);8 (2) even if BDC's claim were not 
time-barred, BDC possessed no interest in Wolckenhauer's 
retirement and pension benefits; and (3) even if BDC 
possessed an interest in Wolckenhauer's retirement and 
pension benefits, its interest was junior to the IRS's 
interest. BDC appeals the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Were BDC to prevail in this litigation, it would be entitled to the 
$323,948.44 seized by the IRS pursuant to the April 21, 1995, notice of 
levy. $407,148.44 is the sum of the amount seized by the IRS pursuant 
to its notice of levy ($323,948.44) and the amount of restitution required 
under the March 12, 1998, restitution order ($83,200). 
 
7. The claims asserted by BDC against parties other than the IRS were 
dismissed by consent orders entered on January 12 and April 22, 1998. 
 
8. While the District Court concluded that the time limitation in section 
6532(c) could be equitably tolled, the District Court also concluded that 
the facts of this case did not give rise to a situation in which the time 
limitation should be equitably tolled. See supra  note 1. 
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II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Jurisdiction in this case is at issue. However, the District 
Court did have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1331, 
to determine if it had subject matter jurisdiction over BDC's 
claim. See 28 U.S.C. S 1331 (1999) ("The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States."). We have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, to determine whether the District Court properly 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction over BDC's claim. See 
28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1999) ("The courts of appeals . . . shall 
have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States . . . ."). Although the 
parties did not address the issue of jurisdiction per se, as 
we have held previously, "it is axiomatic that this [C]ourt 
has a special obligation to satisfy itself of its own 
jurisdiction, as well as the jurisdiction of the court under 
review." United States v. Touby, 909 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 
1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
 
Our review of the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. See, e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police 
Dept., 174 F.3d 95, 128 n.29 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
       [We] review the district court's summary judgment 
       determination de novo, applying the same standard as 
       the district court. . . . [I]n all cases[,] summary 
       judgment should be granted if, after drawing all 
       reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in the 
       light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court 
       concludes that there is no genuine issue of material 
       fact to be resolved at trial[,] and [that] the moving party 
       is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Kornegay v. Cottingham, 120 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 446 (3d Cir. 
1994)). In determining whether the District Court erred, we 
must view the facts as asserted by the nonmoving party as 
true, if they are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary 
material. See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 
1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). We also must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See 
id. at 1081. A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue 
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of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow 
a jury to find in its favor at trial. See Brewer v. Quaker 
State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Relevant Statutory Language 
 
Section 7426(a)(1) provides third parties with a civil 
cause of action to recover from the IRS property"wrongfully 
levied." 26 U.S.C. S 7426(a)(1) (1999); see, e.g., Internal 
Revenue Service v. Gaster, 42 F.3d 787, 789 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Section 6532(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, which sets 
forth the relevant time limitation for wrongful levy actions 
brought pursuant to section 7426(a)(1), states: 
 
       c) Suits by persons other than taxpayers.-- 
 
       (1) General rule.--Except as provided by paragraph 
       (2), no suit or proceeding under section 7426 shall 
       be begun after the expiration of 9 months from the 
       date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such 
       action. 
 
       (2) Period when claim is filed.--If a request is made 
       for the return of property [wrongfully levied upon], 
       the 9-month period prescribed in paragraph (1) shall 
       be extended for a period of 12 months from the date 
       of filing of such request or for a period of 6 months 
       from the date of mailing by registered or certified 
       mail by the Secretary to the person making such 
       request of a notice of disallowance of the part of the 
       request to which the action relates, whichever is 
       shorter. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 6532(c) (1999). Thus, as the statute clearly 
indicates, "no suit or proceeding under section 7426 shall 
be begun after the expiration of 9 months from the date of 
the levy." 26 U.S.C. S 6532(c)(1) (1999). 
 
While it is undisputed that BDC's claim was filed after 
the nine-month time limitation set forth in 26 U.S.C. 
S 6532(c)(1) had expired, BDC argues that the time 
limitation should be equitably tolled.9  Specifically, BDC 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The IRS issued the notice of levy on April 21, 1995; BDC brought suit 
under section 7426(a)(1) against the IRS on November 7, 1996, over 
eighteen months later. 
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argues that because the order requiring Wolckenhauer to 
pay restitution to BDC was not handed down until after the 
nine-month time limitation in section 6532(c) had expired, 
it did not acquire an interest in Wolckenhauer's pension 
and retirement benefits until after the time limitation in 
section 6532(c) had expired. Therefore, BDC argues, 
because it could not have brought suit against the IRS until 
it acquired an interest in Wolckenhauer's pension and 
retirement benefits, which occurred after the time limitation 
in section 6532(c) had expired, this time limitation should 
be equitably tolled now to allow BDC to bring suit pursuant 
to section 7426(a)(1). 
 
B. Principles for Determining the Appropriateness of 
Equitable Tolling 
 
Before determining whether the time limitation in section 
6532(c) should be equitably tolled, we must first determine 
whether the time limitation in section 6532(c) can be 
equitably tolled. As we have held on numerous occasions: 
 
       Time limitations analogous to a statute of limitations 
       are subject to equitable modifications such as tolling, 
       see Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman , 38 
       F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994), which "stops the 
       running of the statute of limitations in light of 
       established equitable considerations," New Castle 
       County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1125 
       (3d Cir. 1997). On the other hand, when a time 
       limitation is considered jurisdictional, it cannot be 
       modified and non-compliance is an absolute bar. See 
       Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387. 
 
Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections , 145 F.3d 
616, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Seitzinger v. Reading 
Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239-40 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that Title VII's 90-day time limitation is akin to a 
statute of limitations and thus is subject to equitable 
tolling); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 
F.3d 1116, 1126 n.12 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Where thefiling 
requirements are considered `jurisdictional,' non- 
compliance bars an action regardless of the equities in a 
given case." (quoting Hart v. J. T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 
F.2d 829, 832 (3d Cir.1979))) (internal quotation marks 
 
                                8 
  
omitted); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 
F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Shendock v. 
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs , 893 
F.2d 1458, 1462-64 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("When 
Congress intends the sixty days it specified as the time to 
seek review of an adverse Board decision in a court of 
appeals to be a mandatory condition upon the availability 
of the judicial remedy of review, the statutory provisions 
relating to the time and place of filing are termed 
`jurisdictional.' "). To determine whether the time limitation 
in section 6532(c) is a statute of limitations, which can be 
equitably tolled, or a jurisdictional bar, which cannot be 
tolled, regardless of the equities in a given case,"we look to 
congressional intent by considering the language of the 
statute, legislative history, and statutory purpose." Miller, 
145 F.3d at 618; see Shendock, 893 F.2d at 1462-64. 
 
In making this determination, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence provides significant guidance. As the 
Supreme Court has stated, "[t]ime requirements in lawsuits 
between private litigants are customarily subject to 
`equitable tolling.' " Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook 
County, 493 U.S. 20, 27 (1989)); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("[E]quitable tolling may be appropriate if (1) the defendant 
has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has `in 
some extraordinary way' been prevented from asserting his 
rights, or (3) if the plaintiff has timely asserted his rights 
mistakenly in the wrong forum." (quoting Kocian v. Getty 
Ref. & Mktg Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1983))) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). This case, however, is 
not a "lawsuit between private litigants;" BDC is suing the 
government, not a private litigant. Because the time 
limitation in section 6532(c) is applicable exclusively to 
suits brought under section 7426, and because section 
7426 creates only a cause of action against the United 
States, and not against private litigants, it is inappropriate 
to assume that the time limitation in section 6532(c) is 
necessarily like other time limitations that are"customarily 
subject to `equitable tolling.' " 
 
Moreover, because BDC is suing the United States, and 
not a private litigant, sovereign immunity is implicated. It is 
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black letter law that "the United States cannot be sued . . 
. without the consent of Congress." Block v. North Dakota, 
461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). Section 7426 clearly constitutes 
a waiver of sovereign immunity. Thus, as the Supreme 
Court has stated on myriad occasions: 
 
       [W]hen Congress attaches conditions to legislation 
       waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States, 
       those conditions must be strictly observed, and 
       exceptions thereto are not to be lightly implied. When 
       waiver legislation contains a statute of limitations, the 
       limitations provision constitutes a condition on the 
       waiver of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, although we 
       should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly 
       restrictively, we must be careful not to interpret it in a 
       manner that would "extend the waiver beyond that 
       which Congress intended." 
 
Id.; see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) ("[A] 
waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be 
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the 
sovereign."); United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 
(1995) (holding that when confronted with a purported 
waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity, the 
Court will "constru[e] ambiguities in favor of immunity"); 
United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841(1986) ("When 
the United States consents to be sued, the terms of its 
waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of the 
court's jurisdiction.") (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 
U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); Bowen v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 
467, 479 (1986) (holding that the "the 60-day limitation" for 
bringing suit against the government to contest the denial 
or termination of social security benefits is"a condition on 
the waiver of sovereign immunity, and thus must be strictly 
construed"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) 
("[L]imitations and conditions upon which the Government 
consents to be sued must be strictly observed and 
exceptions thereto are not to be implied."). Thus, in 
determining whether the time limitation in section 6532(c) 
is a statute of limitations, which can be equitably tolled, or 
a jurisdictional bar, which cannot, we are mindful of the 
fact that section 7426(a)(1), the statutory provision 
pursuant to which BDC brings suit against the government, 
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is a waiver of sovereign immunity. Moreover, section 
6532(c), which sets forth the time limitation applicable to a 
wrongful levy action brought against the government 
pursuant to section 7426, is a condition on the waiver of 
sovereign immunity expressed in section 7426(a)(1) and 
must be strictly observed; exceptions are not to be lightly 
implied. 
 
1. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs  
 
Against the backdrop of these general principles, the 
Supreme Court has on two occasions since 1990 
considered when a time limitation applicable to a lawsuit 
brought against the government can be equitably tolled. 
The Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit, in determining 
when such time limitations can be equitably tolled, has 
focused exclusively on congressional intent. See United 
States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 353 (1997) 
("[C]ongressional efforts . . . seem but a smaller part of a 
larger congressional objective: providing the Government 
with strong statutory `protection against stale demands.' ") 
(citations omitted); Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990); Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 ("in 
determining whether a specific time limitation should be 
viewed as a statute of limitations or a jurisdictional bar, we 
look to congressional intent by considering the language of 
the statute, legislative history, and statutory purpose."). 
 
First, in 1990, the Supreme Court considered whether 
the time limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c), a 
provision of Title VII, could be equitably tolled. See Irwin, 
498 U.S. at 91.10 Before reaching the merits of the case, the 
Court acknowledged the inconsistency of past Supreme 
Court opinions that addressed when time limitations 
applicable to lawsuits against the government could be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Section 2000e-16(c) stated in relevant part: 
 
       Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by . 
. . the 
       Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . and employee or 
       applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of 
his 
       complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, 
       may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this 
title. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c) (1986). 
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equitably tolled.11 Characterizing its opinion as an attempt 
to develop a coherent framework for determining when 
equitably tolling is appropriate, the Court in Irwin stated: 
 
       Thus, a continuing effort on our part to decide each 
       case on an ad hoc basis, as we appear to have done in 
       the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing 
       unpredictability without the corresponding advantage 
       of greater fidelity to the intent of Congress. We think 
       that this case affords us an opportunity to adopt a 
       more general rule to govern the applicability of 
       equitable tolling in suits against the Government.  
 
Id. at 95. Addressing the specific time limitation at issue, 
the Irwin Court acknowledged that "section 2000e-16(c) is 
a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus 
must be strictly construed." Id. at 93 (citing Library of 
Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986)). However, the 
Court concluded that 
 
       [o]nce Congress has made such a waiver, . . . making 
       the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against 
       the Government, in the same way that it is applicable 
       to private suits, amounts to little if any broadening of 
       the congressional waiver [and therefore] the same 
       rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable 
       to suits against private defendants should also apply to 
       suits against the United States. 
 
Id. at 95. As this language demonstrates, the Irwin Court 
concluded that because private defendants could be sued 
under 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5, and because the applicable 
time limitation could be equitably tolled in lawsuits 
between private litigants, Congress must have intended for 
the time limitation to be equitably tolled (when appropriate) 
in lawsuits brought against the government. See id.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986); 
Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1957). 
 
12. Although the Irwin Court held that the time limitation set forth in 
section 2000e-16(c) could be equitably tolled, the Court eventually 
concluded that the facts of the case before it did not give rise to a 
situation where the statute of limitations should be tolled. See Irwin, 
498 
U.S. at 96; supra note 1. 
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2. United States v. Brockamp 
 
Subsequent to its holding in Irwin, the Supreme Court 
again addressed the issue of when a time limitation 
applicable to a lawsuit against the government can be 
equitably tolled. See United States v. Brockamp , 519 U.S. 
347 (1997). The Court in Brockamp, considering whether 
the time limitation set forth in 26 U.S.C. S 651113 could be 
equitably tolled, was quick to point out that Irwin was not 
controlling. See id. at 349-50. While the Irwin Court held 
that "the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling 
applicable to suits against private defendants should also 
apply to suits against the United States," the Brockamp 
Court noted that because section 6511 does not create a 
cause of action against private defendants, the"rebuttable 
presumption" created by the Court in Irwin  arguably did 
not apply to the time limitation set forth in section 6511. 
Id. Nonetheless, the Brockamp Court assumed, but only for 
the sake of argument, "that a tax refund suit and a private 
suit for restitution are sufficiently similar to warrant asking 
Irwin's negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to 
believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling 
doctrine to apply?" Id. at 350. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Section 6511 is quite complex and states in part that a "[c]laim for 
. . . refund . . . of any tax . . . shall be filed by the taxpayer within 
3 
years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax 
was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was 
filed . . . within 2 years from the time the tax was paid." 26 U.S.C. 
S 6511(a) (1986). The statute also states that"[n]o credit or refund shall 
be allowed or made after the expiration of the period of limitation 
prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund isfiled . . . within such 
period." 26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(1). This point is reiterated: 
 
       If the claim was filed by the taxpayer during the 3-year period . . 
. 
       the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of 
       the tax paid within the period, immediately preceding the filing of 
       the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of 
time 
       for filing the return. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(2)(A). Finally, the statute states that "[i]f the 
claim 
was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or 
refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the 2 years 
immediately preceding the filing of the claim." 26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(2)(B). 
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Thus, applying Irwin's rebuttable presumption and 
addressing the specific time limitation in section 6511, the 
Brockamp Court first noted that: 
 
       Section 6511 sets forth its time limitations in 
       unusually emphatic form. Ordinarily limitations 
       statutes use fairly simple language, which one can 
       often plausibly read as containing an implied 
       "equitable tolling" exception. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. 
       S 2000e-16(c) (requiring suit for employment 
       discrimination to be filed "[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of 
       notice of final [EEOC] action"). ButS 6511 uses 
       language that is not simple. It sets forth its limitations 
       in a highly detailed technical manner, that 
       linguistically speaking, cannot easily be read as 
       containing implicit exceptions. 
 
Id. The Court also noted that: 
 
       Section 6511 sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic 
       time limits, and those very specific exceptions do not 
       include "equitable tolling." See [26 U.S.C.] S 6511(d) 
       (establishing special time limit rules for refunds related 
       to operating losses, credit carrybacks, foreign taxes, 
       self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad 
       debts). 
 
Id. at 351-52. The Brockamp Court ultimately held that 
Congress did not intend to permit equitable tolling with 
respect to section 6511: 
 
       To read an "equitable tolling" provision into these 
       provisions, one would have to assume an implied 
       exception for tolling virtually every time a number 
       appears. To do so would work a kind of linguistic 
       havoc. Moreover, such an interpretation would require 
       tolling, not only procedural limitations, but also 
       substantive limitations on the amount of recovery--a 
       kind of tolling for which we have found no direct 
       precedent. Section 6511's detail, its technical language, 
       the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and 
       substantive forms, and the explicit listing of 
       exceptions, taken together indicate to us that Congress 
       did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open- 
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       ended, "equitable" exceptions into the statute that it 
       wrote. There are no counter-indications.  
 
Id. at 352. Reinforcing this conclusion, the Court explained 
that "[t]ax law, after all, is not normally characterized by 
case specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities." 
Id. The Brockamp Court further pointed out that: 
 
       The nature of the underlying subject matter--tax 
       collection--underscores the linguistic point. The IRS 
       processes more than 200 million tax returns each year. 
       It issues more than 90 million refunds. See Dept. of 
       Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, 1995 Data Book 8- 
       9. To read an "equitable tolling" exception into S 6511 
       could create serious administrative problems by forcing 
       the IRS to respond to, and perhaps litigate, large 
       numbers of late claims, accompanied by requests for 
       "equitable tolling" which, upon close inspection, might 
       turn out to lack sufficient equitable justification. 
 
Id. at 352-53. Thus, a unanimous Court in Brockamp held 
that the time limitation in section 6511 could not be tolled, 
regardless of the equities in a given case. 
 
C. Equitable Tolling and Section 6532(c) 
 
Turning to the case at hand, and the time limitation in 
section 6532(c), BDC argues that this time limitation is 
analogous to the time limitation at issue in Irwin and thus 
can be equitably tolled, while the IRS argues that this time 
limitation is analogous to the time limitation at issue in 
Brockamp and thus cannot be equitably tolled. While we 
acknowledge that the time limitation at issue in this case 
falls somewhere between the time limitation considered in 
Irwin and the time limitation considered in Brockamp, we 
conclude that section 6532(c) is a jurisdictional bar, 
analogous in almost all relevant respects to the time 
limitation at issue in Brockamp, and therefore that the time 
limitation in section 6532(c) cannot be equitably tolled. 
There are several reasons for our conclusion. 
 
1. Suits Brought Only Against the Government 
 
First, like the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, but 
unlike the time limitation at issue in Irwin, the time 
limitation in section 6532(c) applies only to suits brought 
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against the government and not suits brought against 
private defendants. Indeed, section 7426(a)(1), which 
section 6532(c) modifies, authorizes only suits against the 
government. Thus, Irwin's "rebuttable presumption" does 
not apply; "making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to 
suits against the Government, in the same way that it is 
applicable to private suits" has no meaning in the context 
of a statute that creates only a cause of action against the 
government. 
 
BDC tries to counter this point by arguing that a suit at 
common law for recovery of money converted is analogous 
to a suit brought pursuant to section 7426(a)(1). Therefore, 
BDC argues, making the rule of equitable tolling applicable 
to suits against the government brought under section 
7426(a)(1), in the same way that it is applicable to private 
suits at common law for the recovery of money converted, 
amounts to little if any broadening of the congressional 
waiver, and thus the same rebuttable presumption of 
equitable tolling applicable to suits against private 
defendants at common law for the recovery of money 
converted should also apply to suits against the United 
States brought under section 7426. While this argument is 
not without intuitive appeal, it fails as matter of law 
because the time limitation set forth in section 6532(c) does 
not and would not apply to private suits at common law for 
the recovery of money converted.14 Our analysis is 
reinforced by the Supreme Court's skepticism in Brockamp 
that "a tax refund suit" brought under 26 U.S.C. S 7422 
and "a private suit for restitution" are "sufficiently similar" 
to warrant the application of Irwin's "rebuttable 
presumption." Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350 (citing sources 
for the proposition that "a tax refund suit" brought under 
26 U.S.C. S 7422 and "a private suit for restitution" are not 
analogous); see also, e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. There exists no federal statute, nor as a matter of federal 
constitutional law could there exist a federal statute, creating a private 
cause of action for the recovery of money converted by a private 
individual or entity. Cf. United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 
(1995) (holding that prohibiting by means of federal criminal law the 
possession of guns in and around local schools is an unconstitutional 
extension of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause). 
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145, 153-154 (1960) (citing Curtis's Administratrix v. 
Fiedler, 2 Black 461, 479 (1863)) (distinguishing common- 
law suit against the tax collector from action of assumpsit 
for money had and received); George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. 
Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 382-383 (1933); William T. Plumb, Jr., 
Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 685, 687 (1947) (describing collector suit as a 
fiction solely designed to bring the Government into court). 
In comparing the time limitation at issue in Irwin with the 
time limitation at issue in this case, it is clear that were we 
to apply the rule of equitable tolling to suits against the 
government brought under section 7426(a)(1), it would 
amount to a substantial broadening of the congressional 
waiver. Therefore, the reasoning of the Irwin  Court is 
entirely unpersuasive with respect to section 6532(c). The 
provision at bar is similar to the tax provision considered in 
Brockamp and distinguishable from the Title VII limitation 
considered in Irwin, reinforcing the conclusion that section 
6532(c) cannot be equitably tolled. 
 
2. The Structure of Section 6532(c) 
 
Second, like the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, but 
unlike the one at issue in Irwin, section 6532(c) "sets forth 
its time limitation[] in unusually emphatic form." Brockamp, 
519 U.S. at 305. While the time limitation at issue in Irwin 
was permissive in nature, the time limitation at issue in 
Brockamp and the time limitation at issue in this case are 
not. Compare 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c) (1990) ("[A]n 
employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the 
final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take 
final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as 
provided in [42 U.S.C. S] 2000e-5.") (emphasis added) with 
26 U.S.C. S 6511(b)(1) (1996) ("No credit or refund shall be 
allowed or made after the expiration of the period of 
limitation prescribed . . . unless a claim for . . . refund is 
filed . . . within such period.") (emphasis added), and 26 
U.S.C. S 6532(c)(1) (1996) ("No suit or proceeding . . . shall 
be begun after the expiration of 9 months from the date of 
the levy or agreement giving rise to such action.") (emphasis 
added). Thus the emphatic, non-permissive nature of the 
language in section 6532(c) also suggests that the time 
limitation at issue cannot be equitably tolled. 
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Moreover, like the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, 
but unlike the time limitation at issue in Irwin , section 
6532(c) "sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time 
limit[], and those very specific exceptions do not include 
equitable tolling." Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 251. Section 
6511(d) establishes special time limit rules for refunds 
related to operating losses, credit carrybacks, foreign taxes, 
self-employment taxes, worthless securities, and bad debts. 
See 26 U.S.C. S 6511(d) (1996). Similarly, section 6532(c)(2) 
states that 
 
       [i]f a request is made for the return of property 
       described in section 6343(b), the 9-month period 
       prescribed in [section 6532(c)(1)] shall be extended for 
       a period of 12 months from the date of filing of such 
       request or for a period of 6 months from the date of 
       mailing by registered or certified mail by the Secretary 
       to the person making such request of a notice of 
       disallowance of the part of the request to which the 
       action relates, whichever is shorter. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 6532(c)(2) (1996). The existence of an explicit 
exception in section 6532(c)(2) to the generally applicable 
nine-month time limitation in section 6532(c)(1) further 
suggests that the nine-month time limitation in section 
6532(c)(1) cannot be equitably tolled. Moreover, both the 
time limitation at issue in Brockamp and the time limitation 
at issue in this case are provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code set forth at Title 26, Subtitle F, Chapter 66, entitled 
"Limitations." See 26 U.S.C. SS 6511, 6532(c) (1996); see 
also Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352 ("Tax law, after all, is not 
normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting 
individualized equities."). 
 
3. The Underlying Subject Matter 
 
Finally, like the time limitation at issue in Brockamp, 
"[t]he nature of the underlying subject matter--tax 
collection--underscores the linguistic point." Brockamp, 
519 U.S. at 352. In light of the "more than 200 million tax 
returns" and "90 million refunds" that the IRS processes 
annually, the Brockamp Court was clearly concerned about 
the administrative burden the IRS would face if the Court 
permitted section 6511 to be equitably tolled. Id. While 
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wrongful levy claims undoubtedly compose a much smaller 
subset of taxpayer suits brought against the IRS than do 
claims for "credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax 
imposed by" the IRS,15 equitably tolling the time limitation 
in section 6532(c) could nevertheless pose serious 
administrative problems because anyone, not just the 
taxpayer in question, can bring a wrongful levy suit against 
the IRS. 26 U.S.C. S 6511(a) (1996); see Brockamp, 519 
U.S. at 352 ("The nature and potential magnitude of the 
administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to 
pay the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases 
(penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed) 
in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement 
system."). Compare 26 U.S.C. S 7422 (creating a cause of 
action for taxpayers seeking a refund from the IRS) 
(emphasis added), with 26 U.S.C. S 7426 ("If a levy has 
been made on property or property has been sold pursuant 
to a levy, any person (other than the person against whom 
is assessed the tax out of which such levy arose) who 
claims an interest in or lien on such property and that 
such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil 
action against the United States in a district court of the 
United States.") (emphasis added). 
 
Holding that section 6532(c) can be equitably tolled could 
open the floodgates to countless suits brought under 
section 7426 against the government by various third-party 
creditors laying claim to assets seized by the IRS many 
years after the expiration of the time limitation set forth in 
section 6532(c). Cf. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352. Thus, the 
potential for administrative problems alluded to by the 
Brockamp Court is arguably at least as, if not more acute 
in our case than in Brockamp because equitable tolling 
could lead to myriad, stale wrongful levy claims by various 
third parties. Cf. id. at 352-353. 
 
In addition to potential administrative problems 
associated with countless wrongful levy suits brought 
against the IRS, we are mindful of the IRS's need for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The time limitation at issue in Brockamp , set forth in section 6511, 
applies to claims for "credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax 
imposed by" the IRS. 26 U.S.C. S 6511(a) (1996). 
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certainty and finality when imposing a levy on the assets of 
a delinquent taxpayer. We also acknowledge that third 
parties with an interest in assets owned by delinquent 
taxpayers should be able to sue the IRS if it wrongfully 
imposes a levy on those assets. Nevertheless, in situations 
where the IRS imposes a levy on the assets of a delinquent 
taxpayer, only to discover that another party has a superior 
claim to the assets, the IRS will be forced to seek other 
assets to satisfy the tax liability in question. Were we to 
hold that section 6532(c) can be equitably tolled, we would 
delay the final disposition of competing claims in cases like 
this one and would jeopardize, perhaps even destroy, the 
IRS's ability to impose a levy on other assets owned by a 
delinquent taxpayer. Such an outcome is not only at odds 
with purpose behind 26 U.S.C. S 7426, but also the thrust 
of the Supreme Court's holding in Brockamp. See 
Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352.16 
 
D. Other Courts' Analysis of Equitable Tolling and 
Section 6532 
 
Although the issue of whether the time limitation in 
section 6532(c) is a statute of limitations, which can be 
equitably tolled, or a jurisdictional bar, which cannot be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Like the time limitation at issue in Irwin, but unlike the time 
limitation at issue in Brockamp, section 6532(c) uses "fairly simple 
language," rather than "highly detailed,""technical" language. Brockamp, 
519 U.S. 350. Viewed in isolation, this fact suggests that like the time 
limitation at issue in Irwin, section 6532(c) can be equitably tolled. 
However, when the "fairly simple language" of section 6532(c) is 
considered in the context of the other facts discussed above, all of which 
indicate that Congress did not intend for section 6532(c) to be equitably 
tolled, it seems fairly clear that section 6532(c) cannot be equitably 
tolled. A holding to the contrary would be tantamount to concluding that 
if Congress were not to "set forth [] time limitations in a highly 
detailed 
technical matter," id., all time limitations applicable to lawsuits 
against 
the government, which are, as a matter of law, "condition[s] to the waiver 
of sovereign immunity," could be equitably tolled. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94. 
Such a conclusion is untenable and is at odds with the Irwin Court's 
acknowledgment that statutes that are "a condition to the waiver of 
sovereign immunity must be strictly construed." Id.; see also, e.g., Lane 
v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) ("[A] waiver of the Government's 
sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in 
favor of the sovereign."). 
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equitably tolled, is one of first impression in our circuit, 
four of our sister circuits have addressed this issue since 
the Supreme Court's holding in Irwin, with three of these 
circuits concluding that the time limitation set forth in 
section 6532(c) is a jurisdictional bar.17  The Second, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have each concluded that 
section 7426(a)(1) is the exclusive remedy available to third 
parties asserting claims to property levied by the IRS and 
that the failure to file a timely claim as required by section 
6532(c) deprives a federal district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Miller v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 134 
F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1998) ("The Millers do not dispute 
they failed to assert a timely S 7426(a)(1) wrongful levy 
claim on the Fort Smith/Nashville property, [and t]hus, the 
Millers' claim to the Fort Smith/Nashville property is 
outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district 
court."); Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. United States, 28 F.3d 690, 
691 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's dismissal 
of a wrongful levy action, untimely under section 6532(c), 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Williams v. United 
States, 947 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). Several 
district courts have also held that section 6532(c) acts not 
as a statute of limitations but as a jurisdictional bar. See 
Compagnoni v. United States, No. 94-0813-CIV-MARCUS, 
1997 WL 416482, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 1997) (denying 
a motion for reconsideration of the district court's earlier 
order dismissing a wrongful levy claim, untimely under 
section 6532(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'd 
on other grounds, 173 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 1999); Fanning 
v. United States, No. 1:95-CV-222-RCF, 1996 WL 343462, 
at *2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 1996) ("As the government points 
out, the statute of limitations set forth in I.R.C.S 6532(c) 
`acts not only as an affirmative defense, but also as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Ninth Circuit opinions on this issue are inconsistent. Compare 
Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1995) (Hawkins, J.) 
(affirming the District Court's dismissal of a section 7426(a)(1) claim, 
untimely under section 6532(c), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction) 
with Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204 1206 n.2 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J.) ("The district court erroneously believed the 
statute of limitations contained in S 26 U.S.C. 6532(c)(1) to be a 
jurisdictional prerequisite and, accordingly, dismissed under Rule 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."). 
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restriction of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction 
over an action that is untimely filed.' ") (citations omitted), 
aff'd mem., 117 F.3d 1432 (11th Cir. 1997); Hanna Coal 
Co., Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, No. CIV.A.92-0071-B, 
1994 WL 666928, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 12, 1994) 
("Therefore, if the statute of limitations espoused in 26 
U.S.C. S 6532(c) has expired, then the United States' limited 
consent to be sued has also expired and this Court would 
not have proper subject matter jurisdiction over this 
matter."), vacated on other grounds, 1994 WL 762188, at *1 
(W.D. Va. Nov. 18, 1994). But cf. Gothenburg State Bank & 
Trust Co. v. United States, No. 7:98CV5026, 1999 WL 
314928, at *2 (D. Neb. Apr. 9, 1999) (stating without 
explanation that "failure to file a timely wrongful levy claim 
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction" but 
holding that section 6532(c) can be equitably tolled). Thus, 
the vast majority of federal courts to address squarely this 
issue have concluded that the time limitation in section 
6532(c) is a jurisdictional bar that cannot be tolled, 
regardless of the equities in a given case, and that the 
failure to file a claim under section 7426(a)(1) prior to the 
expiration of the time limitation in section 6532(c) deprives 
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
Reinforcing the conclusion that a district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a wrongful levy 
action that is untimely under section 6532(c) are decisions 
in four sister circuits holding that the failure tofile a timely 
claim as required by section 6532(a)18  deprives a federal 
court of subject matter jurisdiction. See RHI Holdings, Inc. 
v. United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1461-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(holding that a taxpayer's failure to file a timely claim 
pursuant to section 6532(a) deprives the court of subject 
matter jurisdiction); Marcinkowsky v. United States, 206 
F.3d 1419, 1421-22 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same); Bartley v. 
United States, 123 F.3d 466, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating 
that unless the taxpayer files a timely claim under section 
6532(a), "a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a 
suit for refund"); Miller v. United States , No. 96-2787, 1997 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Section 6532(a) governs claims "under section 7422(a) for the 
recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum." 26 U.S.C. 
S 6532(a) (1996). 
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WL 381958, at *1-*2 (4th Cir. July 11, 1997) (unpublished 
opinion) ("Miller appeals from the district court's order 
dismissing his tax refund suit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because he failed to file his suit within the two- 
year statute of limitations provided by I.R.C. S 6532(a)[; w]e 
affirm."); Oatman v. Department of Treasury-Internal 
Revenue Service, 34 F.3d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The 
district court lacks jurisdiction over claims for refunds 
pressed by any potential class members who have not 
satisfied the procedural requirements of 26 U.S.C.SS 6532 
and 7422."). While 26 U.S.C. S 6532(c) is less detailed and 
less complex than 26 U.S.C. S 6532(a),19 in all other 
relevant respects, 26 U.S.C. S 6532(c) is more like 26 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Section 6523(a) states: 
 
(a) Suits by taxpayers for refund.-- 
 
       (1) General rule.--No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for 
       the recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, 
       shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from the date of 
       filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary 
       renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the 
       expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail or 
       registered mail by the Secretary to the taxpayer of a notice of the 
       disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit or 
       proceeding relates. 
 
       (2) Extension of time.--The 2-year period prescribed in paragraph 
       (1) shall be extended for such period as may be agreed upon in 
       writing between the taxpayer and the Secretary. 
 
       (3) Waiver of notice of disallowance.--If any person files a 
written 
       waiver of the requirement that he be mailed a notice of 
       disallowance, the 2-year period prescribed in paragraph (1) shall 
       begin on the date such waiver is filed. 
 
       (4) Reconsideration after mailing of notice.--Any consideration, 
       reconsideration, or action by the Secretary with respect to such 
       claim following the mailing of a notice by certified mail or 
       registered mail of disallowance shall not operate to extend the 
       period within which suit may be begun. 
 
       (5) Cross reference.--For substitution of 120-day period for the 6- 
       month period contained in paragraph (1) in a title 11 case, see 
       section 505(a)(2) of title 11 of the United States Code. 
 
26 U.S.C. S 6532(a) (1986). 
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S 6532(a) than 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c). Like section 
6532(a), section 6532(c) applies only to suits brought 
against the government, sets forth its time limitations in 
unusually emphatic form, sets forth explicit exceptions to 
its basic time limitations (exceptions which do not include 
equitable tolling), and is a provision of the Internal Revenue 
Code set forth in Title 26, Subtitle F, Chapter 66, section 
6532, entitled "Periods of limitations on suits." Moreover, 
like section 6532(a), were section 6532(c) equitably tolled, 
the IRS could be forced to litigate countless, stale claims, 
thus creating "serious administrative problems." These 
similarities suggest that like the time limitation set forth in 
section 6532(a), the time limitation set forth in section 
6532(c) cannot be equitably tolled. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a careful 
reading of Irwin and Brockamp leads ineluctably to the 
conclusion that Congress did not intend for the time 
limitation in section 6532(c) to be equitably tolled. 
Consistent with opinions in our sister circuits, we hold that 
the failure to file a timely wrongful levy claim prior to the 
expiration of the time limitation in section 6532(c) deprives 
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Irwin, 
498 U.S. at 91 ("We granted certiorari to determine when 
the 30-day period under S 2000e-16(c) begins to run and to 
resolve the Circuit conflict over whether late-filed claims are 
jurisdictionally barred."); Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 
913, 915-18 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the Brockamp 
Court concluded that section 6511 was a jurisdictional time 
limitation that could not be equitably tolled); RHI Holdings, 
Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1461-63 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (holding that like the time limitation in Brockamp, a 
taxpayer's failure to file an timely claim pursuant to section 
6532(a) deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction); 
Calderon v. United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 n.4 (9th Cir. 
1997) ("In [United States v. ]Brockamp , the [Supreme] Court 
held that a time-limit on filing tax refund claims was a 
jurisdictional bar, not a tollable statute of limitations."). 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Because BDC's claim, brought pursuant to section 
7426(a)(1), was filed after the time limitation set forth in 
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section 6532(c) had expired, and because the time 
limitation set forth in section 6532(c) is a jurisdictional bar, 
which cannot be equitably tolled, we will remand the case 
to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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